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The Economics of Necessity
Keith N. Hylton
ABSTRACT
The necessity doctrine aligns the private incentive and the social incentive for a property
possessor to take a defensive action that prevents an invasion of his or her property from
occurring. The model described here is also applicable to self-help in contracts.
INTRODUCTION
The famous American necessity cases, Ploof v. Putnam (71 A. 188 [Vt.
1908]) and Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (124 N.W. 221
[Minn. 1910]), present something of a puzzle to readers the first time
around. In both cases, the invading party ties a boat—a sloop in Ploof,
a steamship in Vincent—to the dock of the property possessor in order
to avoid damage during a storm. In Ploof, the property owner untied
the sloop from the dock, and it was destroyed from the force of the
storm driving it against the shore. In Vincent, the steamship crew main-
tained the vessel fast against the dock during the storm and damaged
the dock. The property owner was found liable to the sloop owner in
Ploof, and the steamship owner was found liable to the dock owner in
Vincent.
The lesson from these cases is that under the necessity doctrine, the
invading party is not technically a trespasser as long as his or her entry
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is excused under necessity.1 But the invading party is liable for the dam-
age done by that invasion to the possessor’s property.
The question this raises is, what purpose does the necessity doctrine
serve? The value of not being labeled a trespasser does not appear to
be great, to the invader, if he or she is still strictly liable for the damage
to the possessor’s property. The answer to this puzzle is that the necessity
rule affects the possessor’s incentive to use force to expel the invader
from the property. Since the invader is not a trespasser under the law,
the possessor may be held liable for harm done to the invader, even when
the possessor uses reasonable force to expel the invader.
This outcome suggests that the function of the necessity doctrine is
to regulate the incentives of the property possessor. In this paper, I offer
a simple positive theory of necessity: the doctrine aligns the private
incentive and the social incentive for a property possessor to take a
defensive action that prevents an invasion from occurring. In the absence
of the necessity doctrine, property possessors would take defensive ac-
tions too frequently.
The model below describes the private and social incentives for de-
fensive conduct in response to property invasions.2 The key results of
the model can be explained by considering, first, a setting in which
litigation costs are zero. If litigation costs are zero, an invasion will
occur, given trespass liability, only when the invader’s gain is greater
than the possessor’s loss. Since the gain from invasion is greater than
the loss, there is no social interest in having defensive actions occur, as
long as the cost of defense is positive; and since the victim is compensated
for the loss from the invasion, he or she will never have an incentive to
take a costly defensive action. Thus, in the zero-litigation-cost setting,
there is no divergence between the private incentive and the social in-
centive for defense. There is also no need for a necessity rule at all, since
defensive actions will not be observed.3
1. I am focusing on private necessity rather than public necessity. Private necessity typ-
ically involves a choice between harm to the invader and harm to the property owner.
Public necessity involves a choice between harm to some specific victim and harm to a
larger group of victims.
2. The general conclusion that the private necessity doctrine is optimal is consistent with
the discussion in Posner (1998, p. 191). However, Posner employs reasoning based on an
analogy with the Hand formula to justify the necessity doctrine. This paper, in contrast,
sets out a simple model of the private and social incentives for defense of property.
3. Rizzo (1980, p. 316) notes, as a puzzle, that property owners should have no incentive
to defend given that they will be compensated in a tort action. Making sense of private
necessity begins with an effort to explain the incentives for defensive conduct. The presence
of positive litigation costs provides one explanation for the incentive to defend.
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Now suppose litigation costs are positive. In general, costly defensive
action may be socially desirable because it avoids expensive litigation
or prevents a wealth-reducing transfer of property. However, since a
rational invasion will occur only when the invader’s gain is greater than
the possessor’s loss, costly defensive action may or may not enhance
society’s wealth. But the possessor will always choose to defend when
he or she can avoid personal litigation costs, so this implies an excessive
incentive to defend. Hence, with costly litigation, and in the absence of
the necessity rule, possessors will defend too frequently from society’s
perspective.
The necessity doctrine enhances social welfare because it aligns pri-
vate and social incentives to defend in the presence of litigation costs.
I consider two scenarios: one in which the cost of defense is positive
and another in which the cost of defense is negative. When the cost of
defense is positive, defensive conduct is never socially desirable in re-
sponse to a rational invasion. The liability of possessors to invaders
imposed under the necessity rule removes the incentive to take costly
defensive action in this scenario. In the more general setting in which
the cost of defense may be negative, the necessity rule does not com-
pletely eliminate the incentive to take defensive action, but it optimally
aligns private and social incentives for defense.
Although I focus on property invasion, the analysis of defensive con-
duct in this paper can easily be applied to other settings, notably, self-
help in contract disputes. Consider the case in which the buyer refuses
to accept the tender of some contracted-for item (for example, a newly
constructed house) because he or she perceives features in the item that
are inconsistent with the terms of the contract (Posner 1998, p. 148).
The problem of aligning private and social incentives for self-help is
similar in many respects to the defense-of-property issue studied here.4
1. THE CONTEXT OF NECESSITY
Ploof and Vincent involve storms, but the general pattern is one of an
actor trying to avoid some injury to person or property from a condition
that has arisen without the fault of the actor. In Rossi v. DelDuca (181
4. On the law of self-help in contracts, see Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent (230 N.Y. 239,
129 N.E. 889 [1921]) and Ben-Shahar and Posner (2011).
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N.E.2d 591 [Mass. 1962]),5 the plaintiff invaded the defendant’s prop-
erty while running away from a dog. The necessity rule provides an
excuse for the actor’s invasion. Although most necessity cases involve
an invasion to real property, there appears to be no reason to limit the
necessity rule to real property invasions (Bohlen 1926, p. 319). Suppose,
for example, an actor takes a car in order to escape a ferocious animal
and damages the car while driving it. There is no obvious reason that
this case should be treated differently from Vincent.6
One feature that is observed in all necessity cases is high transaction
costs. The invasion occurs in a setting in which it would be impossible
for the invader and the possessor to bargain, before the invasion, over
the terms on which the invader would be permitted to enter the land.
The cases involve scenarios that are described as emergencies, in the
sense that the actor contemplating the invasion must act immediately
or suffer some substantial loss.
Although all of the cases involve an invasion committed for the pur-
pose of protecting an interest that is greater in value than the loss that
the invasion causes, that is not a sufficient condition for the necessity
defense. If an invader crosses the possessor’s land for the sole purpose
of saving the expense of using some alternative path, that conduct may
not be deemed worthy of the necessity defense. For example, in Jacque
v. Steenberg Homes (563 N.W.2d 154 [Wis. 1997]),7 the defendant
crossed the plaintiff’s property after the plaintiff had refused an earlier
request by the defendant to cut through his land in order to deliver a
mobile home to a customer. Without access to the plaintiff’s land, the
defendant would have had to take a winding, narrow road that was
covered in parts with up to 7 feet of snow. The gain to the invader was
unambiguously greater than the loss to the possessor. However, the court
did not find (or even consider) a necessity justification, and that outcome
5. The plaintiff, a child, ran onto the defendant’s property in an attempt to escape a
dog and while on the defendant’s property was attacked by the defendant’s dogs. The
defendant argued that he was not liable because the plaintiff was a trespasser.
6. There may be valuation issues that distinguish personal property invasions from real
property invasions. However, for many types of personal property, there are thick markets
in secondary trade. In the presence of such markets, it should not be difficult to assess
damages caused by an invasion. Whenever the personal property is not traded in a thick
market and is otherwise difficult to appraise, the invasion of personal property may present
issues not typically presented in the cases of real property invasions. Whenever the invasion
is to the person, rather than to personal property, the valuation issues become more trou-
bling (see Bohlen 1926, p. 323).
7. The necessity defense was not raised in Jacque.
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is consistent with the necessity case law. Jacque did not involve a high-
transaction-cost setting. Steenberg Homes could have continued to bar-
gain with Jacque, or it could have bargained with its own customer to
find an alternative to cutting through Jacque’s property without per-
mission.8
In contrast, even if transaction costs are high, it appears that the
defense also requires that the gain to the invader be greater than the
loss to the possessor. The final sentence of Vincent appears to limit the
necessity defense to instances in which the invader is protecting an in-
terest that is more valuable than that of the possessor.9 Influenced by
this language in Vincent, Bohlen (1926, pp. 314–15) argued that this is
indeed a requirement of the necessity defense.
From the perspective of the invader, it is not of great consequence
whether the law requires the gain to the invader to be greater than the
loss to the possessor. Given trespass liability, an actor will not invade,
at least not rationally, if the gain from an invasion is less than the loss
it would impose on the possessor.
Another feature of necessity cases, reflected in varying degrees, is that
of rational intentional action of the sort required by the trespass doctrine,
as opposed to instinctive action. The invasion in Vincent resulted from
an effort to save property and involved sufficient time for the boat owner
to calculate whether loss of the ship was more costly than damage to
the dock. However, an invader who jumps a fence to avoid a ferocious
animal may not satisfy the intentionality requirement of trespass doc-
trine. Similarly, a possessor who takes a defensive action to save his or
her life under emergency conditions may not be liable to victims. In
Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co. (27 N.Y.S.2d 198 [N.Y. City Ct.
1941]), a taxi driver jumped from his car while it was running in order
to escape a gunman who had boarded it. The car continued, out of
control, injuring a woman and her two children. The taxi company was
not held liable for its driver’s actions. The driver’s defensive conduct
risked injury to the gunman and to others, but it was not unreasonable
8. A similar and perhaps more appropriate case is Southwark London Borough Council
v. Williams ([1971] Ch. 734 [C.A. 1970]). Homeless people invaded and squatted in the
plaintiff’s housing and argued that they should be permitted to stay on the basis of the
necessity doctrine. The court rejected the argument because the defendants could enter the
London housing market and purchase suitable housing at relatively low transaction costs.
9. The case is described as one in which “the defendant prudently and advisedly availed
itself of the plaintiffs’ property for the purpose of preserving its own more valuable prop-
erty” (Vincent, 124 N.W. 222).
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according to the court because of the nature of the threat and the emer-
gency conditions.10
Vincent remains controversial because of its holding that an invader
whose actions qualify for the necessity defense will still be liable for the
harm caused by that invasion.11 But this holding should be understood
in light of the rational nature of the invasion—the fact that it was a case
of property against property and that there was time to calculate the
costs of alternative courses of action.12 Had these features not been part
of the case, the invasion may have been deemed reasonable under the
circumstances. The economic analysis below assumes the conditions of
a rational invasion of the type in Vincent.
2. MODEL
There are two actors, the possessor and the invader. The possessor owns
property that the invader wants to use or to take. Transaction costs are
high, so the invader cannot bargain with the possessor for access to the
property. The invader’s choice is to take or not to take. If the invader
chooses to take, he or she will impose a loss on the possessor.
For example, suppose the possessor owns a dock and the invader
wants to moor his or her boat to the possessor’s dock during a storm.
Because the storm is worsening rapidly, there is no time for the invader
to bargain for permission from the possessor. If the invader moors the
boat successfully, he or she avoids the losses that might otherwise have
resulted if caught out on the waves in the storm. However, when the
invader’s boat is moored to the possessor’s dock, it is likely to damage
10. Laidlaw v. Sage (52 N.E. 679 [N.Y. 1899]) is a case with similar reasoning. The
robber baron Russell Sage was approached in his office by a suicide bomber with a demand
for money. Sage avoided injury by moving his clerk, Laidlaw, between himself and the
terrorist. One ground for finding that Sage was not liable to Laidlaw was that his conduct
was not the sort of rational calculation required under the law of intentional torts. Perhaps
the most famous case of this type is Scott v. Shepherd (96 Eng. Rep. 525 [K.B. 1773]).
Shepherd threw a lighted squib into a market stall, and the squib was thrown by two
intermediate actors before it exploded, putting out one of Scott’s eyes. The court found
that the actions of the intermediate actors were not independent trespasses, because they
were motivated by a “compulsive necessity” to avoid injury.
11. For a recent presentation of the controversy, see Sugarman (2005).
12. To be clear, the necessity defense definitely applies to life versus property trade-
offs—for example, when someone runs onto another person’s property in order to avoid
a threat to life or health (see, for example, Rossi v. DelDuca). But some cases in which
life is at stake may also involve reflexive action that falls below the level of intent typically
required by trespass law.
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the dock as wind and waves from the storm ram the boat against the
dock.
The possessor observes the invader’s decision and can choose to take
a defensive action that prevents the taking. Alternatively, the possessor
can allow the taking to occur and then sue the invader for damages.
The possessor’s decision will be based on a comparison of the costs and
benefits of the alternatives. I use the following terms:
cp p the possessor’s cost of litigation, ;c 1 0p
cd p the invader’s cost of litigation, ;c 1 0d
l p the loss to the possessor from a taking, ;l 1 0
g p the gain to the invader from a taking, ; andg 1 0
a p the cost to the possessor of a defensive action.
I assume that it is cheaper for the possessor to use a defensive action
than it is to litigate; therefore, . This could be true for manya ! cp
reasons. It could be that litigation is extremely costly. Alternatively, it
could be that the damage award provided by the court does not fully
compensate for the loss suffered by the possessor as a consequence of
the taking (to remain within this framework, I would redefine the cost
of litigation to include losses uncompensated in court). For example, if
there are subjective components of the loss suffered by the possessor
from an invasion, the compensation provided by the court will fall short
of full compensation.
I do not assume that the cost of defense is necessarily positive. It is
likely to be positive as a general matter; for this reason I treat asa 1 0
the default assumption. However, I allow for the possibility that a !
. The overall cost of defense could be negative if the defensive action0
has a future payoff that exceeds the immediate short-run cost of taking
the action. For example, taking a defensive action could establish a
reputation for stinginess or for retaliation that deters future invasions.
In this case, the present value of the stream of payoffs associated with
a particular defensive action could easily be positive (which means that
the cost of defense is negative). In contrast, taking a defensive action
could spur future rounds of retaliation that drive the cost of defense
toward infinity (Parisi 2001).
Admittedly, this situation raises the question of whether the private
costs and the social costs of defense differ. To simplify, I will assume
initially that the variable a captures both the private costs and the social
costs of defense. In general, this total is likely to be positive. However,
even from society’s perspective, the cost of a defensive action could be
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negative. For example, a defensive action, by establishing a reputation
for territoriality, could deter predatory behavior by foreign invaders.
2.1. Zero-Litigation-Cost Case
To clarify the model’s presentation, I first consider the case in which
litigation costs are zero. Considering the zero-litigation-cost case initially
will make it easier to understand precisely how litigation costs matter
in understanding the incentive effects of the necessity doctrine.
The invader first chooses whether or not to attempt to take a property
interest of the possessor (for example, to moor a boat to the possessor’s
dock). Since the invader will be held liable under trespass law for the
loss suffered by the possessor as a result of the invasion, the invader
will take if and only if .g 1 l
In response, the possessor will choose whether to take a defensive
action. If the possessor takes a defensive action, the invader will be
thwarted and will therefore forgo the gain, g. It follows that defense is
socially desirable if the sum of the cost of defense and the forgone gain
from invasion is less than the harm that results from the invasion:
a  g ! l. (1)
Thus, if the cost of defense is positive, defensive conduct is never socially
desirable in response to a rational invasion.
Will the possessor act in defense even when the cost of defense is
positive? Since the possessor will be compensated for the loss, l, under
trespass law, he or she will not suffer any harm from the invasion.13
Thus, the possessor will not have an incentive to act in defense, since
that would involve taking a costly action to avoid a loss of zero. It
follows that if litigation costs are zero, then in the default setting in
which the cost of defense is positive, the private and social incentives
to act in defense are aligned.
Now suppose that the cost of defense is negative. This may be so
because there is a positive future payoff from taking the defensive action
that exceeds the immediate cost. In this case, the social desirability of
13. I assume that the court provides full compensation. If the court provides less than
full compensation—say, because there is a subjective component of loss that cannot be
observed—then the possessor clearly will suffer some harm even with compensation taken
into account. This concern is effectively addressed by the positive-litigation-costs case ex-
amined in the remainder of the paper. In the positive-litigation-cost setting, compensation
provided by the court fails to fully relieve the plaintiff of the harm suffered from the
invasion. Thus, the positive-litigation-costs case can be considered equivalent to the zero-
litigation-costs case with courts providing less than full compensation.
This content downloaded from 128.197.026.012 on November 09, 2017 06:19:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
E C O N O M I C S O F N E C E S S I T Y / 277
defense is still governed by equation (1). However, the possessor will
always have an incentive to take the defensive action, given that a !
. Socially undesirable defensive conduct can occur, specifically when0
the cost of defense is less than the loss/gain differential ( ). Suppose,l  g
for example, that the possessor’s loss from invasion is $10 and the
invader’s gain is $100. If an act of defense has a short-run cost of $20
but brings an expected payoff of $40, the cost of defense would be $20,
and the possessor would choose defense even though it is not socially
desirable.
2.2. Positive-Litigation-Costs Case
In this section, I consider the far more realistic scenario in which liti-
gation costs are positive. I show that in the default setting of positive
defense costs, the private and social incentives to act in defense are not
aligned. I then examine the function that the necessity doctrine plays in
aligning the private and social incentives to take defensive action.
2.2.1. Trespass Law without the Necessity Rule. First, consider what hap-
pens in the absence of the necessity doctrine. The invader will be held
liable for trespass if he or she chooses to take the possessor’s property,
provided the possessor brings a lawsuit. Since I assume that the posses-
sor’s loss is greater than the litigation cost, that is, , the possessorl 1 cp
will bring a lawsuit. Given this scenario, the invader will rationally take
if and only if his or her gain exceeds the expected liability,
g 1 l  c , (2)d
because if the invader takes, he or she will get the gain but will also
have to pay for the loss to the possessor and the personal litigation
expense.
In response to an attempted invasion, the possessor can choose to
defend or to forgo defense and litigate for damages after the invasion.
From a social perspective, defensive action is preferable to litigation if
a  g ! l  c  c , (3)p d
which means that the sum of the cost of the defensive action and the
gain to the invader is less than the sum of the loss to the possessor and
the total litigation cost. Alternatively, the defensive action is socially
desirable when
a  (c  c )  (g  l) ! 0. (4)p d
Thus, in the absence of the necessity rule, defense could be socially
desirable when (1) the cost of the defensive action is less than the total
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cost of litigation or (2) the gain to the invader is less than the loss to
the possessor. Welfare-enhancing defense either substitutes toward a
cheaper method of terminating a dispute (no invasion, no dispute) or
prevents a transfer of property that would have reduced society’s wealth.
Given that a rational invasion implies that the invader’s gain is greater
than the possessor’s loss, the defensive action will be socially desirable,
in the absence of the necessity rule, if it is so much cheaper than litigation
that it outweighs the welfare loss from preventing the wealth-enhancing
transfer.14 Thus, unlike the zero-litigation-cost case examined earlier,
defensive action could be socially desirable even when the cost of defense
is positive.15
From the private perspective of the possessor, the defensive action is
preferable to litigation as long as
a ! c , (5)p
which is assumed to hold. If the possessor takes a defensive action, there
will be no invasion; hence, the only cost incurred by the possessor when
he or she takes a defensive action is a. If the possessor chooses the option
of no defense plus litigation, he or she will be compensated for the loss
from the taking but will still bear the cost of litigation.16 It follows, then,
that the possessor will choose defense over litigation.
Since the possessor will always choose the defensive action, there is
a conflict between the private incentive and the social incentive for de-
fense. From a social perspective, the defensive action should be taken
when and only when equation (4) holds. From the private perspective
14. Put another way, since , given a rational invasion, defense is sociallyg  l  c 1 0d
desirable if the savings to the possessor from choosing defense instead of litigation, c p
, is greater than the invader’s net gain, .a g  l  cd
15. This model does not incorporate settlement. If settlement were incorporated, then
the cost of litigation would obviously be less, and it would be less likely that defensive
action could be socially desirable. Still, dispute resolution through settlement or litigation
involves time and delay, while defensive conduct operates immediately. Given this reality,
it is unlikely that the argument here would change if the model incorporated settlement
of litigation.
16. The conditions described here would change in form if I assumed a different allo-
cation rule for litigation costs, such as the English rule. However, what is important in
this analysis is that the possessor bears some cost that will not be compensated fully in
court. As long as the litigation process fails to fully compensate the possessor for every
loss he or she suffers from the taking, there will be some cost suffered by the possessor in
the event that he or she chooses to litigate. If cp is interpreted broadly to capture non-
reimbursable litigation expenses (for example, time spent with an attorney or finding an
attorney or a court delay) or nonreimbursable elements of loss, then the relative cost
efficiency of defense in comparison to litigation is likely to hold true irrespective of the
litigation cost allocation rule.
This content downloaded from 128.197.026.012 on November 09, 2017 06:19:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
E C O N O M I C S O F N E C E S S I T Y / 279
of the possessor, the defensive action will always be taken because it is
a cheaper form of dispute termination. Why spend $2 in court when
you can spend $1 in preventing the property invasion up front?
2.2.2. Trespass Law with the Necessity Rule. Now consider the impact
of the necessity doctrine. If the invader’s gain exceeds the expected li-
ability ( ), the invader will intrude on the possessor’s property.g 1 l  cd
Under the necessity doctrine, the possessor will be liable to the invader
for the harm suffered by the invader as a result of the possessor’s de-
fensive action.
First, consider the social perspective on defense, under the necessity
doctrine. If the possessor defends, he or she will now be required to
compensate the invader as a result of litigation.17 The social cost of the
defensive action is therefore . The social cost of not de-a  g  c  cd p
fending (and litigating) is . Defense is therefore socially pref-l  c  cp d
erable to nondefense if , ora  g  c  c ! l  c  cp d p d
a  g ! l, (6)
which is the same as the social desirability condition in the zero-
litigation-cost case. Thus, under the necessity doctrine, as long as the
cost of a defensive action is positive, the defensive action will not be
socially desirable in any instance of a rational invasion.
Now consider the private incentive to defend under the necessity rule.
If the possessor defends, he or she will incur the defense cost, a, and
liability to the invader as well. If the court takes factual causation into
account in assessing damages, that liability amount will be the difference
between the invader’s gain and the possessor’s loss, . Obviously, theg  l
possessor will be liable for g. But if the possessor did not defend, he or
she would have received l from the invader. The real level of damages
to the invader is therefore . Thus, for the possessor, defense is pri-g  l
vately preferable to nondefense if or, equivalently,a  (g  l)  c ! cp p
, which is the condition under which defense is socially pref-a  g ! l
erable. Thus, if courts assess damages accurately, the necessity rule aligns
private and social incentives to defend property.
Even if courts do not assess damages accurately (that is, by taking
factual causation into account), the necessity rule still generally aligns
private and social incentives to take defensive action. In the setting in
17. Given a rational invasion (one that satisfies equation [2]), the invader clearly will
have an incentive to bring suit for damages equal to g against the possessor who took the
defensive action. Since a rational invasion implies that , it follows thatg  l  c 1 0 g d
, so that the thwarted invader will bring suit.c 1 0d
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which there is no necessity rule, the possessor always takes the defensive
action, even though it is an inefficient response to a rational invasion
( ). With the necessity rule (even if the court ignores causation ing 1 l
assessing damages), the possessor’s incentive to take the defensive action
becomes nearly equivalent to the socially optimal incentive. To see this,
suppose the court awards damages to the invader equal to g (instead of
). The possessor would choose defense only when and,g  l a  g ! 0
therefore, would never choose defense when the cost of defense is positive
or for a range of negative values as well ( ). This would be thea ! g
efficient outcome in response to a rational invasion. Indeed, the posses-
sor’s incentives would be distorted only for values of a greater than g
and less than (which would require, perhaps implausibly, the benefitl  g
of defense to be greater than the value of the property interest to be
protected). When the invasion is not a rational one ( ), applicationg ! l
of the necessity rule could distort the incentive to take defensive action
away from the social interest when courts do not take factual causation
into account. However, as I noted in Section 1, the necessity defense
does not apply to the invader when his or her gain is less than the
possessor’s loss (Vincent, 124 N.W. 222; Bohlen 1926, pp. 314–15).
Given this scenario, the invader would be deemed a trespasser by the
court, so the possessor would owe the invader no damages for the harm
caused by his or her defensive action. The social incentive for defensive
action in the absence of the necessity rule is given by equation (4). Since
it is assumed that equation (5) holds, equation (4) will also be satisfied
when the invader’s gain is less than the possessor’s loss. Thus, the in-
centive to take defensive action remains optimal. It follows that the
doctrine of necessity equates the private and social incentives for a prop-
erty possessor to take a defensive action that prevents an invasion of
that property.
This analysis suggests that the conclusion that the necessity rule ef-
fectively equates private and social incentives for defensive action is
robust to mistakes in the calculation of damages. Indeed, the implication
in Vincent that the necessity rule applies only when the invader’s gain
exceeds the possessor’s loss helps to make the necessity doctrine a robust
solution to the problem of incentive divergence. As long as the court is
accurate in determining the direction of the inequality between the in-
vader’s gain and the possessor’s loss, mistakes in the calculation of either
amount have no material effect on incentives.
I assumed at the outset that the possessor would sue for damages
because his or her loss is greater than the cost of litigation ( ). Givenl 1 cp
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that the possessor will sue, a rational invasion is one in which the gain
to the invader exceeds the possessor’s loss. Suppose, however, that the
possessor’s loss is less than the litigation cost ( ), so that no pos-l ! cp
sessor sues for damages after an invasion. Now all invaders will enter
regardless of whether their gain from invasion is greater than the pos-
sessor’s loss. In the absence of the necessity rule, the possessor would
choose to defend if his or her cost of defense is less than the loss, a !
. This is inefficient, in some instances, because defense is socially de-l
sirable only when . In other words, there are instances in whicha  g ! l
the possessor chooses to defend even though it is not socially desirable.
In particular, the defensive action should not be taken when its cost is
positive and the invasion is a rational one. If the necessity rule is adopted,
the possessor will not take the defensive action in this case. If the cost
of defense is negative (and the invasion is rational), the excessive incen-
tive to act in defense will be replaced by an insufficient incentive to act
in defense, but the distortion disappears as the total cost of litigation
declines.
There is an additional complication in the scenario in which posses-
sors do not sue ( ). Recall that if an invasion occurs when the gainl ! cp
to the invader is less than the loss to the possessor, the necessity rule
(probably) does not apply. If the necessity rule does not apply, the pos-
sessor will always choose to defend in this scenario when the cost of
the defensive action is less than the loss to the possessor ( ). Defensea ! l
will be chosen too often in this scenario, but the necessity doctrine has
no effect here since it does not apply.
3. SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
3.1. Third-Party Victims
The necessity rule may not be optimal when there are third-party victims.
First, consider the case in which the possessor’s defense merely deflects
the invader to another property owner. Return to the scenario in which
the invader is piloting a boat toward the dock of the possessor in search
of temporary mooring during the storm. The possessor blocks the in-
vader from docking his or her boat. The invader pilots the boat to the
dock next door and moors it there successfully. The first possessor blocks
the invasion, and the second possessor suffers the invasion as a result.
Let the loss to the second possessor from an invasion be l2. Defense
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would be socially desirable if .18 If the second possessor’s lossa  l ! l2
is greater than or equal to the first possessor’s ( ), defense would bel ≥ l2
socially desirable only if the cost of defense is negative. If the cost of
defense is positive, defense would not be socially desirable. If the second
possessor’s loss is less than the first possessor’s, defense could be socially
desirable because it deflects the invasion to a possessor whose injury is
less serious.
The necessity rule may or may not move the private defense incentive
closer to the socially optimal incentive. In the case in which the second
possessor’s loss is greater than or equal to the first possessor’s, and the
cost of defense is positive, the necessity doctrine will move the private
incentive closer to the social incentive. If the possessor believes that he
or she will be held liable for the invader’s loss (because he or she is
unaware that the invader will invade the second possessor’s property),
under the necessity rule, the possessor will never choose defense in this
scenario, and that is the socially correct decision. If the second pos-
sessor’s loss is less than the first possessor’s, or if the defense cost is
negative, the necessity rule may not improve private incentives for de-
fensive action.
A variation on the deflection problem arises when there are many
potential victims of either the invasion or the defensive action. Suppose
the invader approaches the possessor’s dock during a storm in a boat
holding diseased cattle. The invader’s boat contains a lifeboat, so if the
possessor refuses to allow the invader to moor, the invader will be able
to survive in the lifeboat, while the diseased cattle perish at sea. If the
possessor allows the invader to moor, the invader’s boat will damage
the dock, and that is the only loss that will be suffered by the possessor
because he or she does not own cattle. However, if the invader unloads
the cattle, they will spread disease to other cattle and thereby harm
ranchers in the community. If, consistent with the incentives created by
the necessity rule, the possessor focuses on the harm to his or her dock
and the harm to the invader (loss of cattle), he or she may choose to
permit the invader to moor. But the costs to neighboring cattle ranchers
could far exceed the loss to the possessor. The necessity rule does not
necessarily lead to the socially desirable outcome in this scenario.
The cattle hypothetical has the following structure: there are n po-
tential victims, all suffering the same loss; the private harm from the
18. This equation is valid with positive litigation costs as long as the costs are the same
whether the first or the second possessor sues.
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invasion is l; and the social harm from the invasion is nl. Defense is
socially desirable if , and this equation is obviously more likelya  g ! nl
to hold as the number of victims increases. Flipping the property right
under the necessity rule does not necessarily move incentives toward the
social optimum. The necessity rule should be replaced, as it is under the
public necessity doctrine, with a general reasonableness inquiry.19
Another variation involves the invader taking the defensive action.
Suppose A knows that a bomb has been planted in B’s car, which is
located on B’s property. He or she also knows that B intends to drive
the car to Times Square in New York to set off the bomb. He invades
B’s property to explode the bomb, where it damages only property. As
a variation on this scenario, suppose the defendant shoots a mad dog
in the street, as in Putnam v. Payne (13 Johns. 312 [N.Y. 1816]). Shooting
the dog could lead to liability to its owner, but the public necessity
doctrine cancels that liability. If the person acting in defense were held
liable, he or she would have little incentive to act, given the risk of
liability. But a decision not to act puts many others at risk.
3.2. Divergence of Private and Social Costs of Defense
To simplify matters, I assumed at the outset that the private cost and
the social cost of taking a defensive action are the same. This is a con-
testable assumption. It is plausible that the private costs and the social
costs of the defensive action differ in some settings.
Suppose the defensive action has a reputational payoff that causes
the possessor to view the cost of the defensive action as negative. The
benefits to the possessor from the reputational payoff may come at the
expense of costs imposed on other members of society. For example,
suppose the defensive action establishes a reputation for niggardliness.
The reputation may cause others to bear greater costs in efforts to steer
clear of the possessor’s land; even though they will be compensated under
the necessity rule, the possessor’s reputation may cause them to search
for other docks first.
In view of this possibility, suppose that the possessor’s defensive ac-
tion cost is represented (still) by a, and the social cost of the defensive
action is represented by . Because defensive action imposes costs onâ
other members of society, . In the absence of the necessity rule, theˆa ! a
possessor still has a socially excessive incentive to take the defensive
19. The classic example of public necessity is the case in which a building is pulled down
in order to prevent the spread of a fire (Bishop v. Mayor of Macon, 7 Ga. 200 [1849]).
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action. In the absence of the necessity rule, the defensive action is de-
sirable from a social perspective when ; while it isâ  g ! l  c  cp d
desirable from the possessor’s perspective when (which is assumeda ! cp
to hold). Thus, in the absence of the necessity rule, the possessor will
take the defensive action even in instances when it is not efficient. Under
the necessity rule, the defensive action is desirable from a social per-
spective when and is desirable from the private perspectiveâ  g ! l
when . In the default setting, in which the private cost of defensea  g ! l
is positive, the necessity doctrine aligns private and social incentives for
defense—because it eliminates the private incentive for defense. In the
more general setting, in which the private cost of defense could be neg-
ative, the possessor’s incentives are not fully aligned with the social
interest, but they are closer to the social interest under the necessity rule
than they are in the absence of the rule.
This case also covers that of misperception of the cost of defense.
One reason for misperception is the inability to evaluate the long-term
cost of defense. The long-term cost may involve retaliation.20 Another
reason for misperception is the desire to punish. Experimental evidence
has indicated a common preference in ultimatum games for the second
mover to punish the first mover who splits a sum of money unfairly.
This desire to punish is likely to be especially strong, on the part of the
possessor, when an invader takes or attempts to take property from the
possessor. This implies that in many settings involving attempted takings,
the perceived private cost of defense will be substantially below the social
cost, because even if the possessor accurately perceives the social cost
of defense, he or she will still deduct the utility gains from punishing
the invader. In view of these behavioral regularities, the necessity doctrine
may play an important role in dampening the possessor’s incentive to
defend.
It is also possible that the cost of the defensive action is lower for
society than it is for the individual, because the defensive act reduces
predators’ incentives to invade. If so, the possessor will defend too in-
frequently from society’s perspective under the necessity rule, and the
rule does not necessarily move his or her incentive closer to the social
incentive.
20. Retaliation implies costs for both the possessor and the invader. The possessor is
unlikely to have information on the retaliation costs of the invader. The result could be a
cycle of escalating retaliation, as modeled in Parisi (2001).
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3.3. Scope of Application
Much defensive conduct is instinctual. People react immediately to ef-
forts to dispossess them of personal property or to invade their land.
Tort law cannot control incentives for instinctual defensive conduct and
makes no effort to do so.
I have focused on rational rather than instinctual defensive conduct.
This does not severely limit the applicability of the analysis. There are
numerous instances in which possessors defend their property on the
basis of calculation rather than instinct. The dock owner in Ploof, in
ordering his servant to untie the plaintiff’s boat, did not react instinc-
tively under emergency conditions. The analysis above should be un-
derstood to apply primarily to settings in which only property interests
are at stake and actors have sufficient time to weigh the costs and benefits
of their actions.21
Indeed, the time periods for defensive conduct can be divided into
roughly three segments. An immediate emergency would be associated
with instinctive conduct, which is largely unregulated by tort law. If
someone attempts to snatch a purse, and the owner pulls it back with
sufficient force to sever the finger of the purse snatcher, there would be
no liability in most instances (absent proof that the owner intended to
maim the purse snatcher). As both more time and the emergency pass,
the owner gains the capacity to rationally weigh the costs and benefits
of a particular defensive action. This is the period in which the necessity
doctrine operates to regulate defensive conduct. As even more time
passes after the invasion without the owner acting, the economics of
defense change. The owner’s acquiescence may lead to an inference that
he or she consented to the taking. Further, the invader will have formed
personal arrangements around possession of the property, which may
cause the loss he or she suffers from the owner’s recapture to be greater
than the gain experienced when he or she initially took the property
(conversely, the property may depreciate in value during the invader’s
possession). Last, the invader is likely to take steps to increase the cost
of recapture to the original possessor, or may retaliate against efforts to
21. The interaction between the interests at stake and the conduct regulated by liability
rules is more complicated than this implies. Vincent is the easiest case to discuss under the
rationality model because only property interests were at stake. In Ploof, there may have
been life interests at stake from the perspective of the invader. From the possessor’s per-
spective, only property interests were at stake. There was no question of compensation to
the possessor in Ploof and therefore no need to determine whether the invader’s conduct
was reasonable in view of the emergency conditions and the life interests at stake.
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recapture, and thus makes the cost of late-stage recapture substantially
greater than that of initial defense. These factors suggest that it may be
desirable for courts to constrain the original possessor’s freedom to use
recapture (as opposed to litigation to recover the item or its market
value at the time of dispossession) after sufficient time has passed, as
we observe in the general rule requiring peaceful recapture (see, for
example, Bobb v. Bosworth, 16 Ky. 81 [1808]).
Of course, the mere fact that the cost of recapture is higher than the
cost of initial defense of property is insufficient by itself to justify a
prohibition of forceful recapture. Given that the cost of initial defense
is a, suppose that the cost of late-stage recapture is 2a. The original
owner, after being dispossessed, has a choice between forceful recapture
and litigation as methods of recovering the property. Forceful recapture
is efficient as a method of recovery if . But even if forceful2a ! c  cp d
recapture is inefficient, the original owner may choose it rather than
litigation because of a divergence in the private costs and the social costs
of defense, which itself may be due to misperception of retaliation costs.
The common-law requirement of peaceful recapture reflects a judgment
that the cost of late-stage recapture is generally greater than the cost of
initial defense and is unlikely to be accurately perceived by the owner.
3.4. Self-Help in Contracts
The model in this paper applies to the problem of self-help in contract
law. Suppose, to borrow from Posner (1998, p. 148), a buyer enters into
a contract with a builder for a house and finds that the completed house
fails to meet all specifications of the initial contract. The buyer has not
paid for the house. He or she can refuse to purchase the house, on the
ground that the conditions of the contract have not been met, or can
purchase the house and sue the builder for the loss incurred by accepting
a house that fails to meet the initial specifications.22 This problem is
entirely analogous to the necessity issue in torts.
The defense cost (a) is the cost the buyer incurs if he or she refuses
22. There is a difficult issue concerning the measure of damages, an issue explored by
Posner (1998). Should the buyer collect damages for the cost of repair or the diminution
in market value? Jacob & Youngs (129 N.E. 891) holds that the cost of repair is the default
remedy in cases of unintentional breach, unless it is out of proportion to the loss in market
value. The harsher remedy (as between the two) is generally required in cases of intentional
breach of the sort associated with fraud.
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the house.23 If the buyer can find many other similar houses to purchase,
the cost of rejection (defense) will be close to zero. If the buyer cannot
find any similar houses to purchase, then the cost of rejection may be
substantial. Similarly, if the builder can easily find another purchaser for
the house, the cost of rejection to him or her (g) will be trivial.24 In
contrast, if the builder cannot find another buyer at the same price (for
example, because the house has special features that do not appeal to
most home buyers), the cost of rejection will be large. If the buyer accepts
the house, he or she suffers a loss (l). Rejection is efficient, under the
assumption that contract breach litigation will occur, only if equation
(4) is satisfied, but the buyer will reject as long as the cost of rejection
is less than the cost of litigation (that is, equation [5] is satisfied). Hence,
there is a divergence between the private incentive and the social incen-
tive to reject. As in the property invasion scenario examined earlier, this
problem of incentive divergence would not be observed if litigation were
costless. Inefficient rejections are especially likely when the buyer can
easily find adequate alternatives to purchase, perhaps because he or she
does not care much about the peculiar features or precise location of
the house, but the seller cannot easily find alternative buyers.
As Posner notes (1998, p. 148), the law does not allow the buyer to
back out of the contract when the alleged breach of contractual con-
ditions is minor. The best illustration of this rule is Jacob & Youngs,
Inc. v. Kent (230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 [1921]), a Cardozo opinion.
The home purchaser refused full payment on a large house in which the
builder had made a trivial error in construction by installing plumbing
pipes, in some portions of the house, of a similar quality but made by
a manufacturer different from the one specified in the contract. The
builder sued for the remaining payment, and the court ruled in favor of
the builder.
Like the necessity rule, the doctrine of Jacob & Youngs requires the
buyer to compensate the seller for his or her loss from the rejection (g)
when the seller’s loss from rejection is large relative to the buyer’s loss
23. For a thorough examination of the factors that influence rejection (defense) costs
and other costs in all settings in which buyers reject the tender of nonconforming goods,
see Priest (1978).
24. This situation is different from the land invasion scenario in the sense that the gain
from the breach now consists of the avoided rejection costs and the money saved by failing
to comply with the contract. In Jacob & Youngs, the costs saved by failing to comply were
trivial. If the cost savings had been substantial, then an inference of fraud would have been
plausible.
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from acceptance (l). The rule aligns private and social incentives to
reject.25 And, in a manner similar to the tort setting, late-stage rejection,
like late-stage recapture of property, is treated less generously by the
law, because of the greater costs to the seller in the contract setting.
The Jacob & Youngs scenario can be contrasted with the work of
Ben-Shahar and Posner (2011), who examine the case for withdrawal
from contracts for standard goods (such as furniture), traded in thick
markets, when the buyer cannot determine his or her personal valuation
of the good until after experiencing it. The Jacob & Youngs scenario
involves a (trivial) nonconformity, in which the purchaser has a right to
sue for losses resulting from the nonconformity. A rational decision not
to fix the nonconformity is equivalent to the rational decision to trespass
in the necessity setting (since it occurs because ). In this setting, theg 1 l
scope for an efficient withdrawal is narrow. In the Ben-Shahar and Posner
analysis, the scope for an efficient withdrawal is considerably broader
(because both g and a are comparatively small, given a thick market,
and because there is no reason to assume that ). Still, their rec-g 1 l
ommendation that the withdrawing consumer be held liable for depre-
ciation has the effect of aligning private and social incentives to withdraw
(reject).
One important difference between the contract setting and the tort
setting is that the contracting parties can write provisions in the contract
detailing when it is permissible for the buyer to reject. Since the parties
will seek to write a contract that minimizes the total costs of the con-
tractual relationship, the contractual provisions will be determined by
equation (6). Thus, rejection will be permitted under conditions in which
the likely costs of rejection are less than the buyer’s loss from acceptance.
4. CONCLUSION
In the absence of the necessity doctrine, property possessors will too
often rationally choose to take a defensive action that prevents an in-
vasion of their property. As long as litigation costs are substantial or
courts fail to fully compensate for injuries to property, possessors gen-
erally will find it cheaper to prevent an invasion through a defensive
25. Given the argument of the preceding section, this rule provides a solution to the
problem of incentive divergence that is robust to errors in the measurement of damages.
Alternatively, if the court measures damages accurately and takes factual causation into
account (so damages would be instead of g in the case of rejection), there would beg  l
no need to apply the balancing test suggested in Jacob & Youngs.
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action rather than allow it to occur and seek compensation afterward.
Invasions that enhance social welfare will be blocked as well as those
that do not. The necessity doctrine corrects this inefficiency by aligning
the private incentive and the social incentive to defend property.
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